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MRF24XA_15 Datasheet, PDF (144/258 Pages) Microchip Technology – Low-Power, 2.4 GHz ISM-Band IEEE 802.15.4™ RF
MRF24XA
TABLE 5-8: IEEE 802.15.4™ TEST CASES: VALID ADDRESSING FORMATS (CONTINUED)
DA
PID
COMP
SA
DEST(2)
Field
TYPES(3) Sizes in
Octets(4)
Description(5)
10
1
11 NOTME
C,D
2|2|0|8 Short destination, Long source (PID compression)
11
0
10
UNI
C,D
2|8|2|2 Long destination, Short source
11
0
10 NOTME
C,D
2|8|2|2 Long destination, Short source
11
1
10
UNI
C,D
2|8|0|2 Long destination, Short source (PID compression)
11
1
10 NOTME
C,D
2|8|0|2 Long destination, Short source (PID compression)
11
0
11
UNI
C,D
2|8|2|8 Long destination, Long source
11
0
11 NOTME
C,D
2|8|2|8 Long destination, Long source
11
1
11
UNI
C,D
2|8|0|8 Long destination, Long source (PID compression)
11
1
11 NOTME
C,D
2|8|0|8 Long destination, Long source (PID compression)
Note 1:
2:
3:
4:
5:
The standard requires 0 in the cases marked by (1); yet, 1 is handled as 0 in such cases by the device parser
(without erroring out).
‘BC1’- Broadcast addr,’BC2’- Broadcast pid, ‘BC3’- Broadcast no daddr, ‘UNI’- Unicast to this node, ‘UNI2’- Uni-
cast to this node when no destination address is present, ‘NOTME’- Unicast to different node, ‘NOTME2’- Uni-
cast to different node when no destination address is present.
Frame Types Legend: ‘A’-acknowledge, ‘B’-beacon, ‘C’-command, ‘D’-data.
DESTPID | DESTADDR | SRCPID | SRCADDR.
In the descriptions, ‘xxxx’ represents a 4-digit hexa number different from ‘FFFF’.
5.3 Security Material
The security material required for CBC-MAC, CTR, and
CCM are the inputs configured to the registers as listed
in Table 5-10.
• SECSUITE<3:0> selects the security suite
consisting of encryption or authentication, or both,
see Table 5-9.
• SECHDRINDX<6:0> is the byte index where
authentication must start.
• SECPAYINDX<6:0> is the byte index where
encryption/decryption must start.
• SECENDINDX<6:0> points at the last byte of the
payload (before MIC and FCS).
• SECKEY<127:0> holds the symmetric Key.
• SECNONCE<103:0> holds a Nonce value that is
unique for each frame while a specific Key is in
use. This ensures sequence freshness (for pro-
tection against repeat-attack) and protects the key
from being deciphered based on the encoded
messages. The transmitter generates the infor-
mation required to generate the Nonce and then
sends to the Receiver as plain text as part of the
frame.
Section 5.4 “Security Material Retrieval with IEEE
802.15.4 Compliant Frames” describes how the
security level is selected and whether the device or
software fills out the above registers before the security
operation is launched. DEVICE/HOST fills in these reg-
isters and the Authentication appends a MIC tag to the
frame (before FCS is appended), after the position
pointed at by SECENDINDX. Encryption/ decryption
alters the “payload” stored in the buffer from SECPAY-
INDX through SECENDINDX. The range defined for
“Payload” does not necessarily coincide with the MAC
payload as explained in the sequel.
Figure 5-2 to Figure 5-9 illustrate the order of all the
security operations, which is valid for both 2003/2006
Compliant Framing modes.
TABLE 5-9: SECURITY LEVEL: MODE OF OPERATION
Security
Level(1)
Payload
MIC Tag of Octets
Comment
0000
0001
0010
0011
Plain text
Plain text
Plain text
Plain text
No Authentication
4 bytes
8 bytes
16 bytes
—
CCM operation. Only defined in 2006.
CCM operation. Only defined in 2006.
CCM operation. Only defined in 2006.
DS70005023C-page 144
Preliminary
 2015 Microchip Technology Inc.